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Abstract—Security should be considered throughout a software 
development process to develop secure applications. This 
security engineering effort is restricted due to  the complexity 
and diffusion of  todays security knowledge. Approaches, such 
as  misuse cases for threat specification and patterns for 
security functionality modeling, try to  use and integrate 
security into software development, but their combined use is 
still  difficult. In this  paper a framework for developing secure 
software systems is  presented, which aims at incorporating  and 
unifying  existing security engineering approaches by applying 
well-established reuse-oriented software development 
paradigms, such as service-orientation. The security-related 
activities and reusable artifacts  of important development 
phases are discussed and the mapping of  artifacts between 
different development phases is presented.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing number of attacks on software systems 
makes it more important than ever to develop secure 
software systems. Especially web-based applications and 
services are faced with numerous threats due to their public 
access. But, the prevailing custom of including security 
functionality after the functional development is infeasible, is 
not fulfilling the actual security needs. Security engineering 
aims for a consecutive secure software develop-ment by 
introducing methods, tools, and activities into a software 
development process [1].
Such an integration has not yet been achieved completely 
as the amount of security knowledge, including theoretic 
models,  technologies and standards, developed until now is 
complex, often diffused, and seldom structured enough to be 
used in a software development process. Opposed to this, 
security can usually be considered reusable across hetero-
geneous functional domains, e.g., access control models such 
as role-based access control (RBAC, [2]) can be used in 
different domains. Yet, so far structured means for reuse of 
security functionality are not successfully employed. Exist-
ing approaches contribute mainly to specific develo-pment 
phases. Yet, while each of these approaches is beneficial in 
its intentions, they are hard to integrate.
In this work, an early version of a framework is 
presented, which aims at structuring existing security know-
ledge in a reusable fashion and providing decision support to 
integrate existing security engineering approaches and 
methodologies more concisely.  The concepts of modern 
reuse-oriented paradigms, such as service-orientation, soft-
ware product lines (SPL) as well as model-driven software 
development (MDSD), are facilitated in our approach.
The goal is to present developers a structured tool set, to 
ease the coherent integration of security aspects into each 
phase and across phases. Thus an increased quality of the 
security functionality is achieved.The framework comprises 
security requirements analysis templates and security pattern 
languages.  The former can be instantiated to analyze the 
security needs of an application in a deterministic way, while 
the latter can be used to choose appropriate security solutions 
and iteratively refine them.
In the next section, approaches relevant for our work will 
be discussed.  In Section 3, the contribution of our approach 
will be described. We further present two projects which lead 
to the development of our framework in Section 4. A 
conclusion closes the body of this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Reuse in security engineering processes is discussed in 
several approaches. The SECTET-framework [3] provides a 
service-oriented security engineering approach for authori-
zation in inter-organizational workflows, but concentrates 
mostly on web-service based architectures.  The Secure-
Change-Project aims at a change-driven security engineering 
approach, in which security requirements are specified, 
which evolve throughout the lifetime of software [4]. While 
the focus of this project is change of security requirements 
and security design, our focus lies on presenting feasible 
choices and decision support for them to increase quality of 
security functionality.
Threat and risk analysis techniques for analyzing and 
specifying security requirements include STRIDE [5], attack 
trees [6], and misuse cases [7].  We are aiming at providing 
deterministic threat descriptions at an appropriate abstraction 
level and link them to appropriate security requirement 
specifications to complement theses techniques, as this is 
were each of them fails short and is thus difficult to apply.
Security patterns are a popular and widely accepted 
method for modeling technology-independent security 
functions [8]. Security pattern languages are utilized to 
describe the connections between multiple patterns and their 
combined usage [9]. But, alternative solutions are not 
considered by existing languages. So far, only SPL 
approaches consider such variations [10]. We aim to enhance 
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security pattern approaches by explicitly showing alternative 
pattern solutions to security problems.
Model-driven security applies to methods of model-
driven software development to the security domain. Secure-
UML [11], UMLSec [12], and the work of Emig et al.  [13]
are among the most prominent approaches in this field. They 
do not consider existing security infrastructures in a service-
oriented way as we intend to do. Also,  they also do not 
provide chocies between alternative security patterns.
III. SECURITY ENGINEERING FRAMEWORK
The framework presented in the following complement 
and unifyies existing approaches in the security engineering 
field by providing reusable security-related development 
artifacts and a decision support for them.
Reuse is at the core of many well-established software 
engineering paradigms, which aim at managing complex 
software systems development, such as service-orientation, 
SPL and MDSD. A security engineering methodology based 
on the reuse of existing security knowledge will lead to an 
increased efficiency in the development of secure software 
and to an improved quality of the security functionality.
An important goal for our approach is to be development 
process agnostic, i.e., the artifacts contributed by our 
framework should be independent from specific software 
development processes and instead be applicable in different 
methodologies and paradigms.
We further aim for decision support and guidance in 
using security knowledge. The security domain comprises a 
large knowledge base, including, e.g., security standards and 
technologies as well as security models,  principles and 
policies. A structured approach is needed for applying this 
knowledge in a development process. The focus lies on 
supporting a decision process by pointing out alternative 
solution to security problems.
Currently, the framework is limited to security within 
web application and service development, thereby neglecting 
lower levels of security measures such as web server, 
operating system, and network, even though this is 
considered bad security practice. Yet,  we do not rule out the 
applicability of our approach to these levels.
The next sections will present the core elements of our 
framework and their intented function. The focus, thereby, 
lies upon the first three phases, i.e., requirements analysis, 
design and implementation phase. Testing and operation are 
important phases in the development of secure applications 
as well, but we exclude them here for brevity reasons.
A. Reusable Security Requirements Templates
Similar to functional requirements elicitation, security 
requirements need to be analyzed and specifed as well to 
determine application security needs. Difficulties in this 
phase concern the appropriate abstraction level and the 
format of the security requirements specification. Often they 
are specified by proposing security functionality, instead of 
constraints to the functionality [14][15].
According to our goals,  our approach strives for 
contributing reusable security requirements analysis 
templates (SecRAT) to this phase. The template’s core is 
based on the relationships between threats, which violate 
security objectives, security requirements, which are capable 
of mitigating the threats and implement security objectives. 
These entities and their relationships form a basic security 
requirements analysis domain model (SecADM), giving 
structure to the templates.  The templates will further be 
categorized into domain-independent SecRATs,  applicable to 
multiple functional domains,  and domain-specific SecRATs, 
describing security requirements and threats specific to a 
functional domain.  This allows for a more focused and 
structured approach to requirements analysis.
Reuse of security knowledge is thereby achieved by 
documenting existing threat knowledge and explicitly 
linking it to appropriate security requirements and objectives. 
Therefore, if a threat is determined to be applicable in an 
application development process,  the appropriate template 
can be instantiated, directly leading to related security 
requirements as well as objectives and vice versa.
The templates are thereby independent of any approach 
for analyzing and specifying security requirements such as 
those mentioned in Section 2. Instead they can be used as a 
structured decision support tool to determine necessary 
security requirements as well as a common specification 
format for any such process and modeling tools. Further, 
each SecRAT is linked to an abstract security functions, 
thereby supporting the transfer between requirements 
engineering and design phase.
B. Security Pattern Language and Variability Model
The goal of the design phase is to implement security 
requirements using appropriate security functions. They are 
firstly specified at a coarse-grained, technology-independent 
architecture-level design and iteratively refined to an fine-
grained, implementation-level design. These functions form 
the security architecture of one or more applications and thus 
need to be integrated into the overall architecture [16].
For the iterative refinement process, a concise security 
pattern language (SecPAL) for each security function design 
is proposed, which builds upon and complements previous 
approaches. It enables the use and combination of multiple 
security patterns, each of which relates to and implements a 
certain security requirement. Thus a decision support is 
offered, in that only compatible patterns are connected in the 
pattern language. Yet,  opposed to previous approaches, the 
focus of the SecPALs lies on iterative refinement.
At each iterative refinement the design is not always 
obvious. In fact, a choice between several design options can 
be made. For example, to implement access control, several 
alternatives exist, including role-based (RBAC, [2]) and 
attribute-based access control [17], each of which might be 
more suitable depending on application context.
To provide an overview over viable alternative security 
patterns applicable to specific security problems, the Sec-
PAL is complemented by a security pattern variability model 
(SecPVM).  In each iterative refinement of a pattern, the 
variability model can be applied to select an appropriate 
variant for a pattern, if necessary. Currently, feature models 
[18], a common tool to model commonality and variability in 
SPL development, are feasible candidates to describe 
security pattern variants including mandatory, optional and 
exclusion relationships.
C. Service-Oriented Security Design
The combination of SecRAT, SecPAL, and SecPVM is 
intended to support the development of new or the extension 
of existing security functionality for software systems. But 
they can also be used to support secure development pro-
jects, which need to be integrated into an existing security 
infrastructure, e.g.,  in an enterprise environment.  In this 
context, we build upon our previous efforts [16][19] by 
applying the service-orientation paradigm, i.e., the reuse and 
restructuring of existing software systems to satisfy business 
needs, to the design phase of security engineering as well.
Reusing existing services narrows security design 
decisions. When developing an application for an IT 
infrastructure in which, e.g.,  RBAC is the standard access 
control policy model, a decision about the policy model to 
use for access control in the newly developed application is 
already determined.
In order to achieve the benefits of using security services 
in the design models, an abstraction of the implemented 
services to a technology-independent level is required, 
displaying appropriate views of the complete security 
architecture to developers [20].
We currently employ a manual approach, in which 
required abstractions are provided by security experts once 
for each utilized product, as we have done in previous work 
[19]. The SecPAL can in this case be used as guidance to 
identify fine-grained patterns within existing security 
frameworks and products. SecPVM can be used to identify 
and document alternative implementations offered by the 
security framework or product. By following the language 
paths in reverse direction, a relationship to more abstract, 
coarse-grained patterns can be established.
D. Standards- and Pattern-based Model-Driven Security
Despite the reuse of existing functionality it is inevitable 
that certain artifacts need to be developed as part of the 
security engineering approach, even though our goal is to 
reduce the number of such artifacts to allow for an efficient 
development. In this context, we continue our previous 
efforts on model-driven security [13], but are more focussed 
on integrating it into a security engineering approach using 
security technology standards and patterns to automatically 
generate necessary artifacts.
While implementing security functionality, employing 
security technology standards offers product independence 
and interoperability. Yet, applying standards without in depth 
knowledge is difficult,  as they include a large degree of flexi-
bility. A very good example for this is the slowly progressing 
adoption of XML-based security standards, developed main-
ly for web service-based applications [21][22]. Note that the 
same can be argued for security frameworks and products.
As a benefit of the security pattern identification and 
specification using the SecPAL described in the previous 
section, specific guidelines and templates on how standards 
are to be utilized to implement a certain security pattern. As 
such, we are able to provide a security platform description, 
which is used as a automatically generate relevant artifacts 
from design models specified using SecPAL.
IV. MOTIVATING CASE STUDY SCENARIO
We are currently applying, refining, and evaluating our 
approach by applying it in the development of two real-
world projects, requiring security functionality.
A. Case Study Description 
The KITCampusGuide (KCG) is a web-based and 
service-oriented geographic information system (GIS). It 
supports employees, students and guest of the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology (KIT) with their daily campus 
activities.  Its basic functionality allows the user to search for 
points of interest (POI),  such as buildings, rooms or offices, 
and display results on a campus map.
This functionality will be extended as a proof-of-concept 
for the european project OpenIoT by enabling students to 
search for available workplaces on the campus. This func-
tionality will be implemented using smart objects. These 
virtual or physical objects, such as rooms, are active partici-
pants in the information systems and can be remotely queried 
and their state modified using sensor and actor technology.
Very early it became clear, that security aspects needed to 
be implemented in the KCG application as the KIT is 
restricted by legislative regulations, so that the privacy and 
anonymity of the users, as well as integrity and confiden-
tiality of the processed data need to be assured, due to the 
location sensitive nature of the application.
As the application was targeted to be integrated into the 
overall KIT  IT-infrastructure, utilization of the existing secu-
rity infrastructure was required. Therefore, the capabilities of 
the provided security services need to be analyzed, so that 
the analyzed security requirements can later be mapped upon 
them.
B. Preliminary Results
We are currently in the progress of formulating an initial 
set of reusable SecRATs for web-based GIS and IoT appli-
cations based on our experiences in developing the KCG ap-
plication as well as best practice security requirements found 
in literature. These SecRATs are extensions of a domain-
independent SecRAT, which is currently developed as well. 
From these, a first draft of the SecADM will be developed. 
For the documentation we are currently using textual 
templates, but are evaluating more formal methods.
We are further using existing works on security patterns 
to formulate appropriate SecPALs for different security 
solutions such as authentication and authorization. Not many 
such patterns are available in the field of IoT-applications, 
which is why we will document new security solutions as 
well. In doing so, we are evaluating and formalizing 
alternative design decisions into an appropriate SecPVM 
using feature models.
We plan to validate our approach by applying it to other 
projects from the same domain to test the integrity of the 
developed artifacts. We further plan to adopt our approach to 
different domains including cloud based applications. To 
evaluate the increased quality of the implemented security 
functionality empirical studies will be performed.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, a security engineering framework was 
outlined, which focuses on the structured reuse of existing 
security knowledge by providing analysis templates and 
pattern languages for security to increase quality of the 
implemented security functionality. We argued the benefits 
of security engineering and pointed out short-comings of 
existing approaches due to missing integration and 
combination. We identified that a structured approach need 
to be based on reuse of existing security knowledge and a 
decision support system in order to be feasible in the field. 
We presented an outline for several contributions to the 
different phases of a development process based on and 
complementing existing approaches, which we think will be 
beneficial to more efficient security engineering. In future 
works, we will flesh out the details of the contributions. We 
further presented current projects, which are used as cases 
studies to demonstrate the practicability of our approach.
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